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WE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS 
The only viable option for us 
IT is interesting that India was the first to propose the Stand-still agreements on test ban as 
early as 1954, at a time when the 
race for acquiring nuclear arms 
pot yet started vigorously, 
wo countries e.g. the United 
States and the former Soviet 
Union had tested nuclear weapons 
by then and stopping testing 
would have been definitely an ef-
fective step towards disarmament 
and non-proliferation. 
Unfortunately, the US failed to 
see the merit in the proposal and 
in fact accelerated the arms race 
by constantly improving the qual-
ity and quantity of weapons 
quickly followed by Russia and 
later by the other three weapon 
states e.g:., UK, France and China. 
It is after a lapse of several dec-
ades and after tha end of cold war 
that the US decided to seriously 
engage in negotiating a CTBT. Af-
t ter two years of negotiation at the 
Conference on Disarmament at 
Geneva (1994-96), the weapon 
vers realised that the CTBT 
not be pushed through as 
as the indefinite extension 
of NPT which legitimatised their 
possession of nuclear weapons. 
Important clause 
India rejected the CTBT linking 
it with time-bound disarmament 
which resulted in the treaty being 
taken through the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 
1996. Since September 1996, the 
treaty is open for signature and 
an important clause in the treaty 
"Entry into Force" (Article XTV) 
stipulates that 44 countries which 
operate nuclear power reactors 
need to sign for the treaty to come 
into force. The key elements of 
CTBT apart from banning "nu-
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clear weapon tests or any other 
nuclear explosion" are, the Inter-
national Monitoring System (IMS), 
On-site inspections and confidence 
building measures. The IMS, 
which is the verification arm of 
the treaty, would use 
seismological, radio-nuclide, hy-
dro-acoustics and infra-sound 
which are advanced technical 
means monitoring the ban. 
Close monitoring 
The IMS would consist of about 
50 primary and 120 auxiliary 
seismological stations backed up 
by about 80 radio nuclide, 11 hy-
dro-acoustic and 60 infrasound sta-
tions spread around the world to 
closely monitor test. In addition, 
satellite imageries would be exten-
sively used as part of national 
technical means (NTM) which is 
only used by the US and Russia. 
The objective of the CTBT is to 
cap development and qualitative 
improvements of nuclear weapons 
by testing. However, the CTBT 
neither addresses the stockpile 
nor other means of development of 
newer weapons and refining the 
existing weapons. For example, 
simulation techniques and con-
ducting sub-critical experiments 
(SCE) fall beyond the scope of the 
CTBT. Even under CTBT, the pos-
sibility of clandestine testing can-
not be ruled out, especially when 
the threshold detection limit has 
been put as one kiloton. The 
usefulness of sub-kiloton low yield 
test and its efficacy in the develop-
ment of radically new or signifi-
cantly improved nuclear weapons 
is a debatable issue among many 
scientists. 
The US has so far conducted 
three sub-critical experiments un-
der the pretext that these do not 
violate the CTBT and that the tests 
are needed to ensure the safety, se-
curity and reliability of the stock-
pile. Even in the case of SCE, the 
opinion of scientists as to the need 
for such tests is widely debated. It 
is clear from all this that the CTBT 
is so designed that while it would 
ensure the security, safety and re-
liability of the stockpile perpetuat-
ing the special status, security and 
leverage of the weapon powers it 
would deny other nations the op-
portunity to develop a deterrent in 
their national security interests. It 
is also clear from various officials 
jot the US that the nuclear deter-
rence is not going to be abandon-
ed. In fact, all steps are being tak-
en to ensure that the stockpile is 
maintained in a safe, secure and 
reliable status. The situation with 
reference to other nuclear powers 
do not appear to be any different 
from the position of the US. 
Additional conditions 
Viewed in this background and 
the fact that India has already det-
onated five nuclear devices includ-
ing a thermonuclear device, It has 
either the option to reject or ac-
cept after stipulating certain con-
ditions. The Prime Minister in a 
recent statement had said that 
India would considering signing 
CTBT but with some additional 
conditions without anyhow clear-
ly stating what these conditions 
are. 
Rejection of CTBT at this junc-
ture would be a hard option and 
is likely to subject India to greater 
pressure from the P-5 and at the 
same time to delink time-bound . 
disarmament would be illogical 
and immoral, immoral in a sense 
that India would be willing to give 
up its noble goal of weapon-free 
world just because of the changed 
situation of declaring itself as a 
weapon-state. 
Second option 
The second option of a condi-
tional acceptance would be better 
since it will signal certain flexibil-
ity in India's attitude. The condi-
tions could be weapon powers 
sharing information on weapons 
similar to what US has promised 
China, dismantling all sanctions 
and embargoes and permanent 
membership in the Security Coun-i 
cil. Till such time there is an 
understanding on the conditions, 
India should continue with the 
unilaterally declared moratorium. 
It is clear from various official 
statements of the US that the nu-
clear deterrence is not going to be 
abandoned. In fact, all steps are be-
ing taken to ensure that the stock-
pile is maintained in a safe, secure 
and reliable status. The situation 
with reference to the other nu-
clear powers does not appear to be 
any different from the position of 
the US placed in a situation with 
the P-5 refusing to commit them-
selves on a time-bound disarma-
ment, the only viable option for In-
dia would be to declare a mora-
torium on tests and watch the pro-
cess of steps that the P-5 would 
take in the direction of getting rid 
of the nuclear weapons once and 
for all. 
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